Cloud computing is Internet-based computing, whereby shared resources, software, and 
Introduction
Today, cloud computing systems are providing a wide variety of services and interfaces to enable vendors to rent out spaces on their physical machines at an hourly rate for a tidy profit (Amazon According to the recent e-crime study conducted in 2009 by the E-Crime Congress in partnership with KPMG, it found that online customers are most at risk and that risk increases as time goes by (KPMG, 2009) . For example, the study reported that 63% of respondents said their customers were predominately affected by poisoned websites. The survey also reported that 40% of the total respondents said that there had been an increase in technical sophistication of these attacks against their customers.
With any new technology, there will be enthusiastic people who want to learn all about it so they can contribute to the wider community and others who want to exploit it so that they can gain some type of advantage. With the emergence of cloud computing, multi-billion dollar organisations like IBM, Amazon, Google and Ebay have already invested in cloud technology. If extortionists threaten to bring down their Cloud System with a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, which is for this paper means many nodes systems attacking one node all at the same time with a flood of messages, it is usually better for a corporation to pay the ransom than see their systems go off line (Fowler, 2009 ). However, it is not only extortionists that can exploit cloud computing. For example, Amazon or Ebay competitors could also use known vulnerabilities to interrupt the normal operations of their cloud system so their customers move onto the next business that can provide them with the service they require. Renting out its sky-high computer infrastructure from Amazon, this actual example happened to the BitBucket.com cloud, who according to the report, went down for 19 h (Metz, 2009 (Dittrich, 2000) and Trinoo (Dittrich, 1999) are still used by attacker today. But most attackers are more inclined to use the less complicated web based attack tools like Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based Denial of Service (XML-based DoS) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)-based Denial of Service (H-DoS) attack due to their simple implementation and lack of any real defences against them. XML-based DoS and its distributed version, XML-based DoS, described by Padmanabhuni et al. (2006) and demonstrated by Jensen et al. (2007) , occurs when an XML message is sent to a Web Server or Web Service with malicious content to use up all their resources. One example of an XML-based DoS attack is called a Coercive Parsing attack, which manipulates the Web Service Request when a Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is parsed to it so that it can transform the content to make it accessible to applications. The Coercive Parsing attack uses a continuous sequence of open tags so that the CPU usage on an Axis2 web server becomes exhausted.
In this paper we introduced a security service to defend against DoS attacks the area of cloud computing. The rest of the paper is made up of the following: Section 2 covers the related work done in the information technology field on security for cloud computing and the XML-based DoS/H-DoS attacks that threaten this security. Section 3 covers the Cloud Tracing & Filtering model and Protector. Section 4 covers the experiments and evaluations. Finally, Section 5 covers our conclusions and future work.
Related work
In the current research on cloud computing (Laplante et al., 2008; Lenk et al., 2009 ) most think of cloud computing as the virtualization of on-demand, elastic, scalable, resource that is service. But as Balding pointed out in his Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) conference presentation, cloud computing is actually much more, and that it really is the abstraction of services (Balding, 2009 ).
Since cloud computing security follows the idea of cloud computing, there are two main areas that security experts look at securing in a cloud system: These are VM vulnerabilities and message integrity A Denial of Service (DoS) is where an attacker attempts to deprive legitimate users of their resources (Rogers, 2009 ). An XML-based DoS attack, according to Padmanabhuni et al. (2007) is where a network is flooded with XML messages instead of packets in order to prevent legitimate users to access network communications. Further, if the attacker floods the web server with XML requests, it will affect the availability of these web services. Attackers can also manipulate the message content, in order to cause the web server to crash as shown in Jensen et al. (2007) .
To adapt XML-based DoS into a Distributed Denial of Service paradigm, called Distributed XML based Denial of Service, the attacker uses multiple hosts to attack the victim with XML-based DoS attacks (shown in Fig. 1 ). Though none of these attacks have been reported as yet, this type of attacks could be a very serious threat facing cloud computing in the future.
Cloud tracing & filtering for cloud computing

Introduction
One of the reasons why attackers are so successful is because of the internet characteristic, which comprise of limited and consumable resources. Attackers can target bandwidth, processing power and storages capacities of a cloud network. Cloud computing has limited resources so it has to provide a highly quality service, however these services can be exhausted with a sufficient number of consumers. With this particular knowledge, attackers can instigate an XML-based DDoS. For example, an attacker can open up a number of browsers in virtual machines so that it can send multiple requests to the victim's web server over a period time. In a XML-based DoS attack, the attacker would order their zombies to instigate a flood attack of oversize messages, against the web server. This again would result in the web server crashing from either executing the oversize messages, or from communication congestion created from the flood. Fig.  2 shows the placement of the Cloud Tracing & Filtering defence system to protect the cloud system from XML-based DDoS attacks.
Cloud tracing & filtering description
Cloud Tracing & Filtering (CTF) can be used in either a network structure, such as a LAN, or a grid network structure. CTF is made within a virtual machine to make placement within the cloud network compatible, flexible and scalable whilst remains a SOA security product.
CTF is deployed at the edge routers in order to be close to the source end of the cloud network. Usually, if no security services are in place for web services, as seen in Fig. 1 , the system becomes quite vulnerable to attacks. Fig. 2 demonstrates how CTF can remedy this by being located before the Web Server, in order to place a Cloud Tracing & Filtering Mark (CTFM) tag within the CTF header. This is accomplished by attaching the Web Service Definition Language (WSDL) to the CTF instead of the web server.
As a result, all service requests are first sent to the CTF for marking, thereby effectively removing the service provider's address and preventing a direct attack. If an attack is discovered or was successful at bringing down the web server, the victim will be able to recover and reconstruct the CTFM tag and as a result reveal the identity of the source.
In an attack scenario, the attack client will request a web service from CTF, which in turn will pass the request to the web server. The attack client will then formulate a SOAP request message based on the service description formulated by WSDL. Upon receipt of SOAP request message, CTF will place a CTFM within the header. It is assumed that WS-Security would replace original username tag with its own username tag.
Once the CTFM has been placed, the SOAP message will be sent to the Web Server. Upon discovery of an attack, the victim will ask for reconstruction to extract the mark and inform them of the origin of the message. The reconstruction will also begin to filter out the attack traffic.
If the message is normal, the SOAP message is then forwarded to the request handler for processing. Upon receipt of the SOAP request, the Web Service will prepare a SOAP response. The web server then takes the SOAP response and sends it back to the client as part of the HTTP response. CTF will not interfere with the response requests or any outgoing message.
Cloud Shield
The Cloud Shield is a trained back propagation neural network (NN), to help detect and filter out XML-based DoS messages. A neural network is a set of connected units made up of input, hidden and output layers. Each of the connections in a neural network has a weight associated with it. In a neural net the focus is on the threshold logic unit (TLU). The TLU inserts input objects into an array of weighted quantities and sums them up to see if they are above the threshold.
Cloud tracing & filtering approach to SOA
Cloud Tracing & Filtering has a number of basic properties and characteristics of the service model (He et al., 2005) . These characteristics are as follows (Ye and Singh, 2007 Q10) :  Loosely coupled: CTF is made from XML based language. This means that it can run on different platforms regardless of the programming language.  Message based interaction: The interaction between the client, CTF, and service provider are all message based.  Dynamic discovery: WSDL is attached to CTF so that all services are known to the public. This means that any client can connect to CTF at any time over the Internet and access the services of the service provider.  Late binding: CTF and the service provider all run in real time. This allows clients to access services whenever and wherever they are.  Policy based behavior: It is planned that a CTF-Policy will be developed in the future, following along the same guidelines as the WS-Security Policy. This policy will dictate messages marking procedures. CTF acts like a service broker within a SOA model (shown in Fig. 3 ), which is a repository for service descriptions, such as WSDL or Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI). 
CTF's algebraic approach to determining path and reconstruction
3.5.1.Assumptions
The assumptions made about our first group of experiments are as follow:  An attacker may control any number of client machines that can be widely distributed across the Internet.  Attackers may know they are being traced.  It only takes a few messages to get CTF reconstruction to begin traceback.  CTF has not itself been compromised by the attackers.  That the web service provider of web service has limited resources.  SOAP headers are being used by the client.  Real source ID is the location of the edge router.
3.5.2.Algebraic coding of path
The approach taken by CTF to encode the traceback information follows the same lines as Dean (2002) , in which a polynomial is used within the tag so that the reconstruction of the path the message has taken can take place. With the use of a polynomial f(x) of degree d in the prime field GF(P), we can then use f(x) given that f(x) evaluated at (d+ 1) unique points. Let f P (x) = M 1 ,M 2 ,…,M n .
3.5.3.Path reconstruction by CTF at cloud victim end
As shown in Fig. 4 , when the message comes into the Cloud Victim (CV), CTF reconstruction will attempt to locate the source of where the message came from. Let k denote the number of attack paths the attacker might use and let L to denote the expected length of an attack path. Note: In this paper we assume that the attack paths are close to L in length. (2002) is because with messages we are able to fit more information into a tag than an IP packet.
Another advantage of using messages is that a distance field can also be introduced via the use of the time-to-live value within the packet that the message comes in. With this distance field, it simplifies path reconstruction by allowing the CV to select a sample of messages for which its TTL is measured by w dist=l for any given l, therefore as long as the attacker is within the distance of l and the routers have not been reset at distance l then it can be assumed the messages are legitimate.
To know if the attacker has stepped within the distance of l, we use the Bleichenbacher-Nguyen reconstruction algorithm. Let the values of x 1 ,…,x n be all the possible values of x. Each set Si has the size at most of j, which is used to find all the polynomials a of degree at most d such that for all i. With each set of S i it contains the distinct y value such that (x i ,y) occurs within the random messages that were sampled. The polynomial a is then set to the polynomials that correspond to the attack path which the attack message has taken.
In an example of how this is applied, the CV selects a sample of N messages to test and for each x i chooses a set S i of the size of m from all of the (x i , y) points in the sample. If the y > m in the (x i , y) sample, then CV chooses which m values to include in S i as attack messages from that particular attack path.
To recognize if the path has a 'false positive' (which is a polynomial that does not correspond with the identification of the message and the reconstruction algorithm) in the random sample, it should be around.
Evaluations
Introduction
The experiment and evaluation of CTF is discussed in a number of areas. The first area is the simulation of how a CTF works at marking incoming messages and to see if a message can be identified as XML-based DDoS. The second area is how accurate CTF is at identifying the source of where the message comes from. We also want to know if CTF is a better performing security method when compared with SOAP authentication or WS-Security in regards to XML-based DDoS attacks. Finally, we examine the results that were produced from the experiments to see what interpretation we can gather within area of cloud computing.
In addition to the areas discussed above, an important point is that even though CTF is a handy tool to identify the source of an attack within a cloud system that is running web services, it does not deal directly with removing the XML-based DDoS threat or preventing XML-based DDoS messages from causing problems. Therefore, with the experiment and evaluations within a cloud computing system the focus will also be on the Cloud Shield to see if it can detect and filter XML-based DDoS messages.
DDoS attack experiment and evaluation
This section covers the DDoS attacks on Iran, with attackers using web-based attack tools like Page Rebooter, IFrames and Do-It-Yourself (DIY), which were used in a 3 pronged attack.
The Page Rebooter website was used for the first part of the attack (Pagerefresher 2009). The attackers inserted the name of the websites they wanted to attack, and with the use of a rebooter which allows to set the interval for refreshing a particular page, which in this case they were setting it at 1 second apart. Then, the attackers went on Twitter and various discussion forums announcing how to use the Page Rebooter website, by opening it up in many browser tabs and just leaving them to refresh the Iran Government website. According to Danchev (2009a) one attacker announced that he had set up 8 virtual machines running on 8 CPUs to run this variety of attack.
The second part of the 3 prong attack was to use an IFrames loading script, which automated the refreshing of the farsnews.com; irna.jr and rajanews.com websites. This resulted in the server crashing and the website page being a complete mess with half of the pictures and content missing from the page.
The last stage of the attack included a DIY, which is a denial of service tool that contains varies attack programs. These tools are BWRaeper.exe, PingFlooder.exe, Server_Attack_By-_C-4.exe and SupportIran.php. Each includes a simple manual and links to large images at the targeted websites.
Experiment
The experiment we conducted was to follow a Twitter post from an attacker who was an active participant at that time (Danchev, 2009a) . By following his/her example, we opened up three virtual servers that contained 20 Firefox browsers and 20 open tabs to each browser. Note: The original attacker had 8 virtual machines (though how many browsers he/she had opened was not stated. We thought 20 browsers and tabs would be sufficient for demonstration) up at that time, but we thought 3 would be efficient to see the affects of the attack. With these open tabs, we then used our own version page refresher website that closely followed the PageRebooter (2009). Note: Fig. 5 displays the Page Rebooter websites for demonstration purposes only it was not used to generate our HTTP DoS attack.
We then set the targeted website to be refreshed and then set the timer to 1 s. Tshark (Wireshark.com, 2009) and tcpdump (tcpdump.com, 2009) were used to collect the http traffic. 
Evaluation of the attack
As we can see in Fig. 5 , the attack started around 0:30 (point A). At this point in time, we started to see how the drain of http request was beginning to drain the virtual web server until it could only handle a few requests around 1:00 (point B). The web server then appears to recover within 5 min, probably due to O/S congestion controls, but as the attack continued, the web server again was reduced to handling only a few http requests at 1:10 (point C). We stopped the attack at around 1:15, but as can be seen with the spikes (point D) the attack had a lasting impact on the web server. 6 in a qualitative comparison with our data, we see some striking characteristics. Before the start of the attack, normal traffic flowed to point A, which saw the beginning of the attack. At point B, where there seemed to be a slight recovery the attack continued to increase the amount of http requests until it reached point C. This is where the web server congestion control probably started up or the system administration initiated some defence controls. But as we can see, they only prevailed for a small amount of time and the attack reached its peak at point D. The reason why the web server started to return to normal is not given in the report, but it is possible that it is due to a change of IP address. As we can see from Fig. 6 , a simple Http-based DoS attack is a very effective attack and to a cloud system, a very viable threat. Currently the only defense against it is to restrict the flow rate of HTTP requests coming into the server by using a proxy server or request the ISP to change the IP address. In the experiment and evaluation section of the Cloud Shield we will show how much of the attack data it is able to detect and filter. 
Experiments using CTF
These experiments were performed on a Dell Dimension DM501 Intel Pentium single-core CPU, 3.0 GHz, 2 GB of RAM and 2 300GB SATA hard-drives. All the programs were implemented on a VM Server 2 (Vmware, 2009) with a Windows XP (Professional) ISO image. The software that was installed was .NET Web Services along with VB.Net. Figs. 7 and 8 display the algorithms used to insert and extract the CTFM tags.
The first experimental group was broken up into two sections: The first section of experiments simulated XML-based DoS attacks against a cloud service provider like Amazon EC2. This XMLbased DoS attack follows the outline within (Jensen et al., 2007) by selecting the XML injection to replicate.
To simulate the success of an attack, the introduction of a random element of chance (50/50) that the message might crash the web service was made. If the web server did not crash, the service provider was able to trace the message source and initiate filtering procedures. However, if the attack was successful, no more messages would be generated. Upon the web server's crash, it was assumed the service provider would restart it. Upon the restart, the service provider would access CTF reconstruction and find the source of the attack. Filtering of the XML-based DoS traffic is left to the experiments and evaluation section of the Cloud Shield.
For the experiments, two things are needed, the header information and ID reconstruction. The header format for CTFM is changed after the SOAP message has been reformatted.
Upon arrival, CTF looks at the SOAP header information on identification, and extracts from the message. If there is no SOAP header, a header is created with the client identification attached. Once the header has been created or updated, the message is forwarded to the web server.
With ID reconstruction, CTF reconstruction is capable of handling the reconstruction of the path back to the true source of the message. In addition, CTF reconstruction is given the instruction by the service provider at the time of the attack or at the end to start the reconstruction process. The information that is extracted should lead to the source of the message attack and initiation of protection measures. 
Evaluation of CTF
The simulation conducted was a message flood attack, using XML injection to replicate. The simulation program was set up to generate a total of 100 messages, and if one of these messages was an attack, then it had a 50/50 chance to crash the web server. If the system did crash, 50 ms was added to the next attacks response time. This response time would steadily decrease over time by 5 ms for every 5 messages that went by but did not crash t he server. This was to simulate the time taken by the service provider to restart their system, locate the source, and filter it.
From the results in Fig. 9 , 84 normal messages were sent over the network, with an unusually high rate of 9 successful attacks that crashed the system. It is surmised, that the reason for the crashes was due to the random chance that we built in to our code, therefore if re-run the number of crashes would probably have been lower. In addition to this, the results show 7 successful attacks were identified by CTF (shown in Figs. 9  and 10 ). Fig. 10 shows the rate at which the CTF was able to identify the source of the 7 attacks, while points A, C and E show that there were 3 crashes (each giving a 50 ms increase to the response time).
Points A and B are interesting because there is a decrease of about 70 ms that indicates there was no successful crash even though there was one attack message between them that did not crash the web server. After point B though, it shows that it recorded the web server crashed two more times out of the total nine crashes recorded. It is interesting to note that at one stage we can see at points C and D there seem to be some recovery. This was probably due to the web server trying to compensate or right itself.
In summary, the above results in Figs. 9 and 10 show that the CTF over a cloud system can detect and identify the seven attack messages with a response time between 480 and 550 ms.
Cloud Shield experiments
To train up the Cloud Shield there is no known dataset available on the Internet that contains normal, XML-based DoS messages. We therefore developed our own through the StuPot project (2009), and which we have already covered in previously sections of the paper.
The datasets were split into two groups, one for a training set (1000 data points) and the second as a test set (1000 data points). The Cloud Shield will firstly be trained with the trained dataset and then tested against the test dataset.
The result of the Cloud Shield shown in Fig. 11 demonstrates that on its training sets it detected around 91% of with a miss rating of 9%. The main issue from our results was that the response time varied significantly from being able to detect the attack traffic within a matter of 20-30 ms to 1 s. One hypothesis is that the dataset was scattered far apart, and so the error ratio within the neural network kept fluctuating. Another hypothesis is that it could be the back propagation. In the next round of experiments we may attempt a HopField or Perceptron Neural Network for comparison. Another reason for the problem in variation of response times could be related to the running of the backpropagation neutral network on the VMware (for example, the settings with the memory and CPU might need slight adjusting) or some fault with the O/S image that caused type of processor corruption. All these reasons still need to be investigated further so they can be eliminated. Fig. 12 showed the results of the trained Cloud Shield against the test data set, with the results down by 3% (detection of 88% of attack traffic). Again the response time varied greatly, just like it did with the trained dataset. Looking at the total of the test results of the Cloud Shield, a score of 88% of the attack traffic is still good, but this score also gives us a clue that the neural network may be varying due to its setting. These are currently at 4 Neuron Layers The results in Fig. 13 show that the training of the Cloud Shield went quite well, with the exception of points C and D. At point A, the results show that the Cloud Shield was able to detect all the attack messages, though at point D there are a few data points at around the 150-200 ms. This means that it took a little over 50 ms extra time than the other messages.
In addition to this, there is a similar pattern with normal messages in Fig. 13 , as with attack messages. As can be seen at point B, detect traffic was quite uniform apart from point C, which at this particular point the normal message being detected is quite early compared to the rest of the messages. One of the reasons for this could be due to the processing speed being freed up, giving the Cloud Shield the quick burst before the O/S decided to re-assign the processor to another job.
The results from Figs. 11 and 12 compared to results from Figs. 13, show that the Cloud Shield had problems of varying response times, while the latter did have various response times but not as varied.
Conclusions and future work
According to Napper and Bientinesi (2009), the cloud computing model has the ability to scale computer resources on demand, and give users a number of advantages to progress their conventional cluster system. In addition, there is no upfront investment to update infrastructure, labor and no ongoing expenses. In fact the total cost of going towards cloud is almost zero when resources are not in use. Therefore it is no wonder that academic research and industry are moving towards cloud computing. However, as security experts, the problem we see is recurrence of the same mistakes that were made with the development of the internet. These mistakes were related to functionality and performance which took precedence over security. Security should in fact be implemented it along side functionality and performance.
In this paper we have discussed our work on service-oriented architecture and the security application to cloud computing. We covered the threats that pose a very serious danger to cloud systems, Denial of Service attacks. We presented a SOA security service, which is called a Cloud Tracing & Filtering (CTF). CTF demonstrated that it can be used in the actual Xml-based DDoS attack so the cloud victim could trace the attack back to the source. The experimental results showed that CTF is able to find the source of an attack. We also developed the Cloud Shield, which is a neural network that was trained to detect and filter Xml-based DDoS attacks. The result we achieved was around 98-99% of the attack traffic within an average of 10-135 ms.
Chaos theory is a field of study in mathematics, physics, economics and philosophy studying the behavior of dynamical systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions. This sensitivity is popularly referred to as the butterfly effect. Next, we plan to further our research to test whether Chaos Theory can explain DoS attacks on cloud computing systems. 
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